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Weshallargue that the attempt carriedoutbycertain
philosophers in this century to parrot the language, the
method, and the results of mathematics has done harm
10 philosophy. Such an attempt resultsfrom a misunder·
standing of both mathematics and philosophy, and has
done harm to both subjects.
1. The Double Life of MathemaUcs
Are mathemat ical ideas invented or discovered?
This question has been repeatedly posed by philoso-
phers through the ages. and will probably be with us
forever. We shall not be concerned with the answer.
Whal matters is that by asking the question, we ac-
knowledge the tact that mathematics has been leadinga
double life.
In the first of its lives. mathematics deals with fads
like any other science. It is a fact that the altitudesof a
triangle meet at a point, it is a fact that there are only
seventeen kinds of symmetry in the plane. it is a fact that
there are only five non-linear differential equations with
fixedsingularities. it is a fact that every finite groupof odd
order is solvable. The work of a mathematicianconsists
in dealing with these facts in various ways. When
mathematicians lalk to each other. they tell the 'acts of
mathematics. In their research work. mathematicians
study the facts of mathematics with a taxonomic zeal
similar to that of the botanist who studies the properties
Of some rare plant.
The facts of mathematics are as useful as the facts
of any other science. No matter how abstruse they may
appear at first. sooneror later they find their way back to
practical applications. The facts of group theory. for
example. may appear abstract and remote. but the
practical applicationsof group theory have been numer-
ous. and they have occurred in ways that no one might
have anticipated. The facts of today's mathematicsare
the springboard for the science of tomorrow.
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In its second life. mathematicsdeals with proofs. A
mathematical theorybeginswith definitions, and derives
its resutts from cJearty agreed upon rules of inference.
Every fact of mathematics must be ensconced in an
axcmatctneory andformallyprovedif it is to beaccepted
as lrue. AxKlmatic exposnon is indispensable in math-
ematics, because the fact of mathematics. unlike the
facts ot physics. are not amenable to experimental veri-
fication.
The axomatk method of mathematics is one ot the
great achievementsot our cunure. However. it is only a
method. Whereas the facts of mathematics, once dis-
covered, wiD never change. the method by which these
facts are verified has changed many times in the past.
and it would be fOOlhardy not to expect that it will not
change again at some future date.
2. The Double Life of Philosophy
The successof mathematicsin leading a double life
haslongbeentheenvyof philosophy.anotherfieldwhich
also is blessed- or maybewe should say cursed - to
live in two wol1ds, but which has nor been quite as
comfortablewith its double life,
Inthe firstof its lives,philosophysetsto itself the task
of telling us how to look at the world. Philosophy is
effective at correcting and redireding our thi~ing . It
helps us do irNay with glaring prejudices and unwar-
ranted assurrptions. Philosophy lays bare contradic-
tionsthat we woukf ratheravoidfacingup to. PhiJosopht-
cal descriptionsmake us awareof phenomenathat lie at
the other endof the spectrum ot rationality. phenomena
which science will not and cannot deal with.
The assertions of philosophy are less reliable than
the assertionsof mathematics. but they run deeper into
the roots of our existence.
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The philosophical assertions of today will be part of
the convnon sense of torcrrow.
In its second life,philosophy,like mathematics, relies
on a methOd of argumentation that seems to follow the
rules of some logic or other. But the method of philo·
sophical reasoning, unlike the method of mathematical
reasoning, has never been clearly agreed upon by phi-
losophers, and much philosophical discussion since the
beginnings in Greece has been spent on discussions 01
method. Philosophy's relationshipwith Goddess Reason
is closer to a forced cohabitation than to the romantic
liaison that has always existed between Goddess Rea-
son and mathematics.
The assertions of philosophy are tentative and par-
tial. It is not even clear what it is that philosophy deals
with. II used to be said that philosophy was "pUrely
speculative ,· and this used to be an expression of praise.
But lately the word "speculative" has become a Bad
Word.
Philosophical argumenls are errotion-laden 10 a
greater degree than mathematical arguments . Pniloso-
phy is etten written in a style which is more reminiscent
of a shameful admission than of a dispassionate de-
scription. Behird every question of philosophy there
lurks a gnart of unacknowledged emolional cravings
which act as powerful motivation for conclusions inwhich
reason plays at best a supporting role . To bring such
hidden emotional cravings out into the open, as phi-
losophers have felt it their duty toclo, is to call fortrouble.
Philosophical disclosures are frequently met w~h the
anger that we reserve for the betrayal of our lamily
secrets.
This confused state of affairs makes philosophical
reasoning more difficull ,butfarrrore rewarding . Allhough
philosophical arguments are blended with emotion, al-
though philosophy seldom reaches a finn conclusion,
althOugh the method of philosophy has never been
clearly agreed upon, nonetheless, the assertions of phi-
Iosophy. tentative and partial as they are .come far closer
to the truth of ourexistence thantbe prootsotmathematics.
3. The Loss of Autonomy
Philosophers of all times, beginning with Thales and
Socrates. have suffered from the recurring suspicions
about the soundness 01 their work, and have responded
to them as best they could .
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The latest reaction against the crilicismof philosophy
began aroundthe tumor the century and is still very much
with us.
Tcday's philosophers (not all of them, Icrtunatejyl
have become greal be lievers in mathemataation. They
have rewritten Gatllec's famous sentence to read "The
great book of philosophy is written in the language of
mathematics.·
~Mathematics calls attention to itself ,· wrote Jack
SChwartz in a famous paper on another kind of misunder-
standing. Philosophers in this century have suffered
more than ever from the dictatorship of definitiveness.
The illusion 01 the final answer, what two thousand years
of Western philosophy had failed to accomplish, was
thought in this century to have come at last within reach
by the slavish imitation of mathematics.
Mathematizing philosophers have claimed that ph i·
Iosophy shOuld be made factual and precise. They have
given guidelines to philosophical argument which are
based ur;x>n mathematical logic. They have contended
that the eternal riddles of philosophy can be definitively
solved by pure reasoning, unencumbered by the weight
of history. Confident in their faith in the power of pure
thought, they have eut all ties to the past. onthedaimthat
Ihe messages 01 past philosophers are now "cbsclete."
Mathematizing philosophers will agree that tradi-
lional philosophical reasoning is radically different from
mathematical reasoning . But this difference, rather than
being viewed as strong evidence forthe heterogeneity of
philosophy and mathematics, is taken instead as a rea-
son for doing away with non-mathematical philosophy
anooemer.
In one area of philosophy the program o. matnema-
tizaHon has succeeded. logic is nowadays no longer a
part 01 philoSOphy. Under the name of mathematical
logic. it is now a successful and respected branch 01
mathematics, one that has found substantial practical
applications in computer science.more so than any other
branch of mathematics.
But logic has become mathematical at a price . Math-
ematicallogic has given up all claims to give a foundation
to mathematics. Very few logicians of our day believe
any longer that mathematical logic has anything to do
wilh the way we think.
Mathematicians are therefore mystified by the spec -
tacle 01 philosophers pretending to re-inject philosophi-
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cal sense into the language of mathematical logic. A
hygienic cleansing of every trace of philosophical reIer-
erce had been the price of admission of logic into the
mathemat ical fold . Mathematical logic isnow just another
branch of mathematics. like topology and probability.
The philosophical aspects of mathematical logic are
qualitatively no different from the philosophical aspects
of topology or tne theOry of func1ions. aside from a
curious lerminology which . by an accident of chance
going back to Leibinz's reading 01 Suarez, goes back to
the Middle Ages .
The fake-philosophical terminology of mathematical
logic has misled philosophers into believ ing that math-
ematical logic deals with the truth in the philosophical
sense. But this is a mistake . Mathematical logic does not
deal with the truth , but only with the game of truth. The
snobbish symbol-dropping one f inds nowadays in
philOsophical papers raises eyebrows among math-
ematicians . It is as if you were at the grocery store and
youwatched someone trying to pay his bill with Monopoly
money.
4, Mathematics and Philosophy: Success and
Failure
By all accounts. mathematics is the most successful
intellectual undertaking of mankind . Every problem of
mathematics gets solved. sooner or later. Once it is
solved. a mathematical problem is forever finished: no
later event will disprove a correct solution. As mathemat-
ics progresses. problemsthat were once difficu lt become
easy enough to be assigned to schoolboys. Thus.
Euclidean geometry is now taught in the second year of
high school. Similarly, the mathematics that mathema-
ticians of my generation have learned in graduate school
has now descended to the undergraduate level. and the
lime is not far when it may be taught in the high schools.
Not only is every mathe matical problem solved, but
eventually , every mathematical problem is proved trivial.
The quest for ultimate triviality is cha racteristic of the
mathematical enterprise .
Whenwe look at the problemsot philosophy. another
Picture emerges. Philosophy can be described as the
stUdyof a few problems whose statements have changed
little since Ihe Greeks : the mind-txx:ty problem. or the
Problem or reality. 10 recall only twO. A dispassionate
lookatthe history ofphilosophy disdoses two contradidory
leatures: first . these problems have in no way been
SOlved. nor are they likely to be solved as lOng as
philOsophysurvives; second . every phdosopherwho has
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ever worked on any of these problems has proposed his
own -definitive solution.· which have been invariably
rejeC1ed as false by his successors .
SUCh Cl'1Jshing historical evidence tcrces us to the
conclusion that these two paradoxical features rnJst be
an inescapable conexmlitant of the philosophical enter-
prise. Failure to conclude has been an outstanding
Characteristic 01 philosophy throughout its history.
Philosophers of the past have repeatedly stressed
the essential role ot failure in philosophy. Jose Ortega y
Gasset. for exa"l'le , used to describe philOsophy as "a
constant Shipwreck.· However. the lear of lailure did not
stop him or any otherph ilosopher from doing philosophy.
Philosophers' fa ilure to reach any kind 01 agreement
does not make their writings any less relevant to the
problemsol ourday. We reread with interest the rnJtually
contradictory theories 01 mind that Plato. Aristotle . Kant,
and Cornie have bequeathed to us. and we find their
opinions timely and enlightening, even in problems ot
artificial intelligence.
Unfortunately. the tatter-cay mathematize rs 01 phi-
lOsophy are unable to lace up to the inevitability of failure.
Borrowing1rom the world of business.theyhave errbraced
the ideal of success . Philosophy had betterbe successful.
or else is should be given up. like any business.
5. The Myth of Precision
Since mathematical concepts are precise, and since
mathematics has been successful , they mistakenly infer
that philosophy would be better off if it dealt with precise
conce pts and unequivocal statements . Philosophy will
have a better chance at being successful. if it beco mes
precise.
The prejudice that a concept rnJst be precisely
defined in order to be meaningful . or that an argument
must be precisety slated in order to make sense. is one
of the most insidious of the Twentiet h Century . The best
known expression 01 this prejudice appears at the end of
LUdwig Willgenstein's Traetatus. and the authof s later
wol1<. in particular the Philosophical Investigations. is a
loud and repeated retraction of his eartier gaffe.
Looked at lrom the vantage point of ordinary experi-
ence. the ideal of precision appears preposterous. Our
everyday reasoning is not precise . yet it is effect ive.
Nature itself . from the cosmos tothe gene. is approximate
and inaccurate.
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The negative opinion that many philosophers hold of
their own field has caused damage to philosophy. The
mathematician's contempt at the philosopher's exag-
gerated estimation ofa method of mathemat icalexposition
teeds back onto philosophers' inferiority complex , and
funher decreases the philosophers' confidence.
Salutary as this injunction may be in mathematics, it
has had disastrous consequences when carried over to
philosophy. Whereas mathematics starts with a defini -
tion, philosophy endswith a definition. A clear statement
of what it is we are talking about is not only missing in
philosophy; such a statement would be the end of all
philosophy. If we could define our terms , then we would
dispense with philosophical argument.
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This mistake betrays the philosophers' pessimistic
view of their own field . Unable or afraid as they are of
singling out, describing and analyzing the structure of
philosophical reasoning, they seek help from the proven
technique of another field , a Heldthat is the object of their
envy and veneration. Secretly disbelieving in the power
of autonomous philosophical reasoning to arrive at the
truth, they have surrendered to a slavish and superficial
imitation of the truth of mathematics.
There is thus a hidden circularity in tormal math-
ematical exposition. The theorems are proved staning
with definitions, but the definitions themselves are rrcti-
Actually, the -define your terms- imperative is deeply
flawed in more than one way . While reading a formal
mathematical argument , we are given to believe that the
"undefined terms." or the "basic definitons" have been
whimsically chosen out of a variety of poss ibilities .
Mathematicians take mischievous pleasure in faking the
arbitrariness of definition. In actual fact, no mathematical
definition is arbitrary . The theorems of mathematics
motivate the definitions as much as the definitions m0-
tivate the theorems. A good definition is "justified- by the
theorems one can prove with it, just like the proof of a
theorem is "justified- by appealing to previously given
definition.
Thisold injunction has becomea platitude in everyday
discussions. What could be healthier than a clear
statement, right at the beginning, of what it is that we are
talking about? Doesn't mathematics stan with definitions
and then develop the properties of the objects that have
been defined, by an admirable and inexorable logic?
7. "Define your terms! "
The concepts of philosophy are among the least
precise . The mind , perception, memory, cognition, are
words that do not have any fixed or clear meaning. Yet,
theyoc have meaning . We misunderstand these concepts
when we force them to be precise. To use an image due
toWittgenstein, philosophical concepts are l~ethewinding
streets of an old city. which we must accept as they are.
and which we must familiarize ourselves with by strolling
through them, while admiring their historical heritage.
Like a Carpathian dictator, the advocates of precision
would raze the city to the ground and replace it with a
straight and wide Avenue of Precision.
This is not , however, the opinion held by our
mathematizing philosophers. They are convinced that
the axiomatic method is a basic instrument fordiscovery.
They mistakenly believe that mathematicians use the
axiomatic method in solving problems and proving
theorems. To the misunderstanding of the role of the
method they have added the absurd pretension that this
presumed method should be adopted in philosophy.
Systematically confusing food with medicine, they have
pretended to replace the food of philosophical thought
with the medicine ct axomatcs.
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The tacts of mathematics are verified and presented
by the axiomatic method . One must guard, however,
against confusing the presentation of mathematics with
the content of mathematics. An axiomatic presentation
of a mathematical fact differs from the fact that is being
presented as medicine differs from tooc, ttis true that this
particular medicine is necessary to keep the mathema-
tician at a safe distance from the self-delusions of the
mind. Nonetheless, understanding mathematics means
being able to forget the medicine, and to enjoy the load.
Confusing mathematics with the axiomatic method for its
presentation is as preposterous as confusing the music
of John Sebastian Bach with the the techniques for
counterpoint in the Baroque age .
The ideal of precision in philosophy has its roots in a
misunderstanding of the notion 01 rigor . It has not
occurred to our mathematizing philosophers that phl-
Iosophy might be endowed with its own kind of rigor. a
rigor that philosophers should dispassionately describe
and codify, as mathematicians did with their own kind of
rigor a long time ago. Bewitched as they are by the
success of mathematics, they remain ensla ved by the
prejrdice that the only possible rigor isthat of mathematics,
and that philosophy has no choice but to imitate it.
6, The Misunderstanding of the Axiomatic Method
vated by the theorems that we have previously decided
ought to be right.
Instead of focus ing on this strange circularity, pnr-
Iosophers have pretended it does not ex ist, as if the
axiomatic method, proceeding linearly from def inition to
theorem, were endowed with a def init iveness which is
instead, as every mathematician knows, a subtle fakery
to be debunked .
Perform the follow ing thought experiment . Suppose
that you are given two formal presentations of the same
mathematical theory. The def initions of the first pre-
sentation are the theorems of the second, and vice -
ve rsa. This situation frequently occurs in mathematics.
Wh ich of the two presentations makes the theory 'rue?-
Neither, evidently. What we nave is two presentations of
the same theory.
This thought experiment shows that mathematical
tlUth is not brought into being by a formal presentation.
Rather, lormal presentation is on ly a technique for d is-
playing mathematical truth. The truth of a mathematical
theory is distinct from the correctness of any axiomatic
method that may be chosen for the presentation of the
theory.
MathematiZ ing philosophers have missed this dis-
tinction.
8. The Appeal to Psychology
What will happen to the philosopher who insists on
precise statements and clear definitions? Realizing after
futile trials that philosophy resists such a treatment, said
philosopher will proclaim that most problems previously
thought to belong to philosophy are heretofore to be
excluded from consideration. He will claim that they are
"meaningless,~ or at best that they can be settled by an
analysis of their statements that will eventually show
them to be vacuous.
This is not an exaggeration. The classical problems
of philosophy have become forbidden topics in many
philosophy departments. The mere mention of one such
problem by a graduate student or by a junior colleague
will result in raised eyebrows,lollowed by severepeoaees.
lnthis dictatorial reg ime,we have witnessed the shrinking
of philosophical aetiv~y to an ilTllOverishedprob!t§malique.
mainly dealing with language.
In order to ~st ify their neglect of most the old and
substantial questions of ph ilosophy, our mathematiZing
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pnrosoprers have resorted to the ruse of daiming that
manyquestions formerly thought to be philosophical are
instead "purely psychological: ancl that they shou ld be
dealt with in the psychology department.
If the psychology department 01 anyuniversity we re
to consider only one tenth of the problems that philoso-
phers are pawning off on them, then psychology wou ld
without question be the most fasc inating of all sub jects .
Maybe it is . But the fact is that psychologists have no
intention of dealing with problems abandoned by phi-
losophers who ha ve been derelict in the ir dut ies .
One cannot do away with problems by decree. The
classical problems of ph ilosophy are now com ing back
with a vengeance in the forefront ot science. Fcrexanoie.
the Kantia n problem 01 the conditions of possibility of
vis ion, after years of neg lect , is now aga in rearing its old
head in bra in science.
Experimental pSYChology, neurophysiology and
computer science may tum out to be the best friends of
traditional philosophy. The awesome ccrroiexaes of the
phenomena that are be ing studied in these sciences
have convinced scientists (well in advance of the philo-
sophical establishment) that progress science will crucially
depend on philosophical research of the most classical
vein .
9. The Reduetlonlst Concept of the Mind
What does a mathematician do when trying to work
on a mathematical problem? An adequate description of
this event might take a thick volume. We shall be content
with recalling an old saying, probably going back to the
mathematician George P6lya: "Few mathematical
problems are ever solved directly.M
Every mathematician will agree that an important
step in solving a mathematical problem, perhaps the
most irrportant step,consists in analyzingother attempts ,
either atte~s that have been previously carried out or
else attempts that one imagines might have been carried
out, with a view to discovering how such "Previous ·
attempts were misled. In short, no mathematician will
ever dream of attacking a substantial mathematical
problem without first becoming acquainted with the his-
tory of the problem. whether the real history or an ideal
history that a gifted mathematician might reconstruct.
The solution of a mathematical problem goes hand-in-
hand with the discovery of the inad equacy of previous
attempts, with the enthusiasm that sees through and
does away w ith layers of irrelevancies inherited from the
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past which cloud the real nature of the problem. In
philosophical terms , a mathematician who solves a
problem cannot avoid facing up to the historicity of the
problem. Mathematics is nothing if not a historical
subject par excellence .
Every philosopher since Heraclitus has stressed
with striking uniformity the lesson that all thought is
constitutively historical. Until, that is, our mathematizing
philosophers came along , claiming that the mind is
nothing but a complex thinking machine, not to be polluted
by the inconclusive ramblings of bygone ages. Historical
thought has been dealt a coup de grace by those who
today occupy some of the chairs of our philosophy
departments . Graduate school requirements inthe history
of philosophy have been dropped,togetherwith language
requirements ,and in their place we find required courses
in mathematical logic.
It is important to single out the myth that underlies
such drastic revision of the concept of mind. It the myth
that believes the mind to be a mechanical device . This
myth that has been repeatedly and successfully attacked
by the best philosophers of our time (Husserl, John
Dewey, Wittgenstein, Austin , Ryle, to name only a few).
According to this myth , the process of reasoning is
viewed as the functioning of a vending machine which, by
setting into motion a complex mechanism reminiscent of
those we saw in Charlie Chaplin 's film Modern Times,
grinds out solutions to problems, like so many Hershey
bars. Believers in the theory of the mind as a vending
machine will rate human beings accoroing by ~degrees"
of intelligence, the more intelligent ones being those
endowed with bigger and better gears in their brains, as
can of course be verified by administering I.Q. tests.
Philosophers believing in the mechanistic myth be-
lieve that the solution of a problem is obtained in just one
way: by thinking hard about it. They will go as far as
asserting that acquaintance with previous contributions
to a problem may bias the well-geared mind. A blank
mind, they believe, is better geared up to initiate the
solulion process than an informed mind.
This outrageous proposition originates from a mis-
conception of how mathematicians work. Our
mathematizing philosophers behave like failed math-
ematicians . They gape at working mathematicians in
wide-eyed admiration, like movie fans gaping at posters
of Joan Crawford and Bette Davis. Mathematicians are
superminds who turn out solutions of one problem after
another by dint of pure brain power, simply by staring at
a blank piece of paper in intense concentration.
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The myth of the vending machine that grinds solu-
tions out of nothing may perhaps appropriately describe
the way to solve the linguistic puzzles of tocay's impov-
erished philosophy, but this myth is far off the mark in
describing the work of mathematicians, or any other
serious work .
The fundamental error is one of reductionism. The
process of the working of the mind, which may be of
interest to physicians but is of no interest to mathemati-
cians, is confused with the progress of thought that is
required in the solution of any problem.
This catastrophic misunderstanding of the nature of
knowledge is the heritage of one hundred-odd years of
pseudo-mathematlzation of philosophy.
10. The illusion of Definitiveness
The results of mathematics are definitive . Noone will
ever improve on a sorting algorithm which has been
proved best possible . No one will ever discover a new
finite simple group, now that the list has been drawn, after
a century of research . Mathematics is forever.
We could classify the sciences by how close their
results come to being definitive. At the top of the Ilst we
would find the sciences 01 lesser philosophical interest,
such as mechanics, organic chemistry , botany . At the
bottom of the list we would find the more philosophically
inclined sciences, such as cosmology and evolutionary
biology.
The old problems 01 philosophy, such as mind and
matter, reality, perception, are least likely to have "solu-
tions ." In fact, we would be hard put to spell out what
might be acceptable as a ~solution.~ The term ~solution~
is borrowed from mathematics, and tacitly presupposes
an analogy between problems of philosophy and prob-
lems of mathematics that is seriously misleading. Per-
haps the use of the word "problem" in philosophy raised
expectations that philosophy could not fulfill.
Philosophers of our day go one step farther in their
mts-analcqies between philosophy and mathematics.
Driven by a mlsptaced belief in definitiveness measured
in terms of problems solved, and realizing the futility of
any anerrot to produce definitive solutions to any of the
classical problems, they have had tochange the problems.
And where do they think to have fOUnd problems worthy
of them? Why, in the world of facts!
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SCience deals with fads. Whatever iT: is that trad i-
tional philosophy deals with, it isnot facts in the scientific
sense. Therefore , traditional pl"lilosophy is worthless.
This syllogism, wrong on several counts , is preen-
cated on the assumption that no statement is of any
value, un less it is a statement 01 fad. Instead of realizing
the absurdity of this assurroton, philosophers have
swa llowed it, hook, line and sinker, and have busied
themselves in making their living on lacts.
But previous philosophers had never been equipped
to deal directly with facts , nor had they ever considered
facts to be any of their business. Nobody turns to
philosophy to learn facts . Facts are the domain 01
science, not of philosophy. And so, a new slogan had to
be coined : philosophy should be dealing with facts .
This ·should comes at the end of a long line of other
· sl'lOuld 's.· Philosophy shouldbeprecise, it shouldfollow
the rules of mathematical logic, it shouJddeline its terms
carefully, it shouldignore the lessons of the past , it should
be successful at solving its problems, it should produce
delinitive solutions.
·Pigs should fly ," as the old saying goes .
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But what is the standing 01 such ·should's,- lIatty
negated as they are by two thousand years 01 philoso-
phy? Are we to believe the not so subtle insinuation that
the royal road to right reason ing will at last be found if we
fo llow these imperatives?
There is a rrcre otausible exp lanation 01this barrage
of should's. The reality we live in is constituted by myriad
contradictions, which traditional philosophy has taken
pains to describe with courageous realism. But contra-
diction cannot be confronted by minds who have put the ir
salvation in axiomatics. The real wond is filled with
absences, with absurdities, with abnonnaJities, with ab-
errances, with abominations, with abuses. with
Abgrund. But our latter-day philosophers are not con-
cerned with facing up to these unpleasant features of the
wond, nor, to be sure, to any real features whatsoever.
They would rather tell us what the world shouldbe like .
They find it satertc escape from distasteful description of
what is into point less prescription of what isn't . Like
ostriches with their heads in the ground,theywill meet the
fate of those who refuse to acknowledge the lessons of
the past andtc meet the Challenge of ourditflOJ!l:present:
increasing irrelevance followed by eventual extinction.
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